

Migration and Development: Old and New Ambivalences of the European Approach

By Laura Zanfrini



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Abstract

This paper examines the evolution of the conceptual framework of the migration and development nexus within the European context, and outlines some of its possible future prospects, based on a reflection on the constraints and opportunities currently challenging policies and practices in this field. On the one hand it analyzes how the link between migration and development was initially conceived and is still being shaped within a migration model featured by an economic approach and by the constant concern for the containment of migratory pressure. At the same time, it reflects on several possible innovative prospects, in the light of transnationalism and its implications for the relationship between migration and development, some considerations suggested by the local development model, the evolution of the EU soft policy framework, and the lessons learned by some interesting projects in this field.

Introduction

In the last years, at international level, a renewed attention for the relationship between migration and development has been emerging. This stemmed from the proliferation of initiatives and resolutions aimed at making the government and the governance of human mobility one of the key elements of the policies to support developing countries' growth, particularly in the case of those countries registering a high migratory pressure.

As it is easy to understand, these initiatives are first of all stimulated by the astonishing evolution that the migratory phenomenon has registered in the last decades in both quantitative and qualitative terms, producing a spectacular growth of the flux of remittances, whose volume has definitely outclassed that of international aids for development. Within this new scenery, while most sending countries have implemented policies aimed to transform their emigrants

into “external citizens”¹ –in order to maintain their attachment and their proneness to send remittances and to finance entrepreneurial and philanthropic projects– several receiving countries have launched programs intended to sustain the initiatives promoted by migrant communities. Finally, we cannot omit that this emerging concern for the issue of co-development has to do with an evident unbalance between the number of individuals who aspire to migrate and the possibilities of legal migration established by destination countries. This latter circumstance constitutes, at the same time, *the constraint and the opportunity* of this new era, particularly from a European standpoint. Actually, Europe is the continent that “invented” the category of the temporary migrant (*guest worker*), assigning him/her, not without some rhetoric, the mission to contribute to the development of his/her origin community, by becoming, once returned home, an agent of modernization. The *constraint* because the prevailing concern continues to be represented by the goal of containing migratory pressure and encouraging the return of temporary migrants and mainly of migrants who lost their job; the *opportunity* because, as never before, the interdependence is now particularly evident among the various regions of the planet, and mainly among those areas that are improperly –from a geographic point of view– defined as the global “North” and the global “South”.

1. The European historical legacy and its “original sin”

The ambition of making the management of human mobility more functional to the development of sending countries is certainly not new in the European landscape. In the optimistic climate of the postwar II, migration, managed through a system of bilateral agreements signed by national governments, was depicted as a phenomenon able to benefit both receiving and sending countries, offering the latter a relief valve for domestic unemployment. Once returned home, temporary migrants were expected to contribute to the development of their home-community, through their saving and the skills acquired abroad. Indeed, western countries national policies with respect to managing migration are usually studied, according to their nature and objectives, as divided into two main groups, following the traditional distinction be-

¹ Bauböck R., «Citizenship Policies: International, State, Migrant and Democratic Perspectives», *Global Migration Perspectives*, 2005, n. 19.

tween the so called “*settlement countries*” (Australia, Canada, the United States) and European countries². Settlement countries, primarily due to the multiethnic profile of their populations, show a greater openness to migration, especially to high-skilled migration. Coherently with human capital models, they select and admit candidates for immigration on the basis of some traits which are deemed to contribute to social and economic inclusion, such as educational attainments, work experience, language proficiency and so on. Moreover, they mainly have (and particularly had in the past) permanent labor migration schemes which are not set up on prior job offer. This kind of approach is difficult to apply in the European context, where labor movements from Third Countries have been normally more limited and strictly managed in response to actual labor market needs. In fact, *the entry of migrants has been traditionally conceived to face specific labor or skills shortages and therefore demand-driven (with employers defining requests) and dependent on a prior job offer*. Besides, in most cases migrants have been granted residence permits of limited duration, since *migration has rarely been supposed to turn to permanent settlement*. More in detail, in many European countries, the aim of satisfying labor market needs has been achieved through recruitment systems such as labor market tests and occupational shortage lists. These methods have certainly contributed to find out skilled vacancies and professional areas lacking in terms of native-born workers; above all, they have identified and categorized jobs that natives are not willing to take up. As a matter of fact, the faculty to lay down the rules of the selection and recruitment process has been entrusted to employers, and entries have been largely restricted to specific sectors and occupations. This has led to severe phenomena of labor market segregation, with a large concentration of migrants in certain occupational segments.

During the ‘1970s, in a context featured by the growing popularity of the Dependency Theory and by the advent of the so called “stop policies” –that is the end of active policies for the recruitment of migrant workers–, several European countries launched programs to promote “voluntary returns”, offering migrants financial incentives, the reimbursement of travel costs, the portability of social security benefits, and also some training in order to favor their occupational reinsertion and the grant of loans to buy a house or to start a business. This experience,

² Papademetriou D.G., Hamilton K.A., *Managing Uncertainty: Regulating Immigration Flows in Advanced Industrial Countries*, Washington D.C., International Migration Policy Program – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995.

to a large extent unsuccessful, will strongly condition the perception of the role that migrants and former migrants can play in the development of their homeland. Few years after their launch, the prevailing attitude towards this kind of initiatives was skepticism.³ Moreover, the concrete evolution of migratory projects demonstrated the fallacy of the guest worker ideology. The attention reserved to policies aimed at attracting migrant workers gave way to the worries for the political implications of a phenomenon until then defined as a purely economic issue. For around two decades, the oxymoron “integration without immigration” will constitute a sort of leitmotiv within the “Fortress Europe”. Immigration, defined as an issue of interior politics, will stimulate strong debates about how to “integrate”, if not even “assimilate”, people with a migratory background. This resulted in overshadowing *the relationships that migrants use to maintain with their sending countries*, at worst conceived as potential obstacles to the integration process.

It is only in the ‘1990s that the role of sending countries peeked out in the official documents of the EU and of member states, opening the way to a new phase of bilateral agreements, which however were primarily aimed to contrast irregular and unwanted immigration.

Finally, in the outset of the new millennium, the European landscape changed meaningfully. On the one hand this has been due to the need to reopen borders to labor migrations, more and more perceived as a solution imposed by the demographic trends and the labor market conditions of most European countries (starting from new immigration countries of Southern Europe, such as Italy and Spain, which, after having registered their migratory transition have become two of the main attraction poles in the international landscape). On the other, this has been determined by several factors which have contributed to attract a growing attention towards the relationship between migrations and development. Like a pendulum, swinging back and forth from optimism to pessimism,⁴ the worry about the process of brain drain caused by international migrations has been redefined in terms of *brain gain* – with a certain degree of rhetoric –, and migrations and remittances have been celebrated as the new “mantra

³ Entzinger H., «Return migration in Western Europe: current policy trends and their implications, in particular for the second generation», *International Migration*, (23), 2, 1985, pp. 263-290.

⁴ De Haas H., «The Migration and Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Research and Policy», *International Migration*, (50), 3, 2012.

of development”.⁵ The latter is founded on a series of axioms aimed to legitimize specific migratory policy strategies and to emphasize the supposed migrations’ advantages for the international community: *i)* migration allows for the transfer of financial and social remittances; *ii)* brain drain will be rapidly replaced by brain gain and brain circulation; *iii)* temporary and circular migration can stimulate development more than permanent migration; *iv)* Diasporas are expected to become collective agents of development (beyond the contribution of single migrants, addressed only to their families; *v)* economic development can eventually reduce migration pressure.

It is easy to read, against the light, the “original sin” of European immigration legacy, whose distinctive mark continues to be represented by the category of the guest worker, today redefined by means of more politically correct wordings as *temporary migration* or *circular migration*. Nevertheless, compared to the past, the idea of co-development –a new wording, which aspires to emphasize, from a semantic point of view, a divide with the past– can be based on new resources and new opportunities. Starting from some acquired awareness, that will be described in the following sections.

2. Future scenario: some awareness from which to move

At the beginning of the new millennium, several international agencies and national institutions promoted inquiries in order to assess migrations impact on the development of sending countries. The investigation produced, again, an ambivalent appraisal. At the same time, from these new studies the relevance emerges of some awareness: some cruxes that can orient our reflection about possible future scenarios:

- a)* The success of disposals and initiatives for the development of sending countries cannot be defined *a priori*, since it depends to a large extent on the “quality” of a territory, i.e. those characteristics that render it more or less receptive to migrants’ contribution. This does not only mean its material and infrastructural features. Factors such as the rootedness

⁵ Kapur D., *Remittances: the new development mantra?*, Paper prepared for the G24 Technical Group Meeting, 13-15 September 2003, United Nations, New York; Glick Schiller N. and Faist T., «Introduction: migration, development and social transformation», *Social Analysis*, (53), 3, 2009, pp. 1-13.

of democracy, the presence of an enlightened ruling class, the vitality of civic society and a stratification open to individual mobility are also of strategic importance in determining the impact of initiatives promoted by migrants, which, in unfavourable contexts, risk being thwarted by hurdles and inertia;

- b) The impact of return migration cannot be interpreted merely in terms of economics, as this would underestimate the *contribution that migrants and former migrants can make to the perspective of a development intended in a wider sense*, with particular attention to the cultural impact of migration and return migration. Migrants and transmigrants take with them not only capital to be invested and professional skills, but also *social remittances*, that is –just to cite some examples, more modern styles of life, new educational approaches, patterns of behavior useful to protect health and to control reproduction, experiences of participation in civil society’s organizations, patterns of family life inspired to a principle of gender equality, a consciousness regarding the importance of welfare provisions;
- c) *Migrations’ impact on the development of sending countries cannot be taken for granted, but it depends, particularly in the medium-long term, on the governments’ ability (of both origin and host countries) to manage these processes, and on their willingness to cooperate.*⁶ As has been observed, «in principle, migration *can* be a real stimulus to home-country development. Migrants *can* acquire relevant training in their receiving country; they *can* be given incentives to invest and reintegrate upon return for the general wellbeing of home societies; and industries and other sustainable economic activities *can* be encouraged to be launched in areas where returnees’ skills can be maximized. But these policies need careful planning and can only happen if there is greater cooperation between sending and receiving countries;⁷
- d) *The success of the policies aimed to promote voluntary returns is generally very limited.* Supports and incentives are frequently enjoyed by migrants who have already decided to repatriate, whereas they can improbably influence individual and familial migratory

⁶ Nyberg Sørensen N., «Revisiting the Migration-Development Nexus: From Social Networks and Remittances to Markets for Migration Control», *International Migration*, (50), 3, 2012; quotation at page 72.

⁷ King R., «Generalizations from the History of Return Migration», in Ghosh B. (ed.), *Return Migration. Journey of Hope Despair?*, International Organization for Migration and the United Nations, Geneva, 2000, pp. 7-55; quotation at page 27.

projects, to the point that many experts think that they are substantially worthless. Moreover, sometimes returned migrants do not have the personal traits in order to operate as agents of development; often, they have already reached the retirement age and they want only to enjoy the fruits of their sacrifices;

- e) *The development of origin countries does not necessarily reduce migratory pressure.* It is quite obvious to affirm that migration is usually a consequence of the lack of development; but an abundant literature shows that there are many factors that contribute to generate migrations, not all strictly related to economic growth (just to give an example, the quality of welfare influences both the genesis and the evolution of migratory projects). At the same time, official aids to development have a very limited discouraging potential, firstly because their volume is definitively lower than that of private remittances. Wellbeing and development created by migrants' savings can even stimulate new migrations, particularly when they generate an unbalanced growth which, by reinforcing social and territorial disparities, feeds the perception of relative deprivation (according to the idea of *migration hump*).⁸

3. Future prospects: Transnationalism and its implications

A second set of reflections come from the popularity acquired, within the studies on migrations and their effects for sending and receiving countries, by the concept of *transnationalism*.⁹ Putting into question "methodological nationalism" and its tendency to consider the borders of Nation-States as "natural",¹⁰ this concept focuses the attention on links transcending national frontiers¹¹ and on transnational practices involving migrants¹²: family and friendship based

⁸ For a deeper analysis see Zanfrini L., *Sociologia delle migrazioni*, Laterza, Rome-Bari 2007, chapter 6.

⁹ See Amelina A. and Faist T., "De-naturalizing the national in research methodologies: key concepts of transnational studies in migration", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 35 (2012), n. 10, pp. 1707-1724.

¹⁰ Wimmer A. and Glick Schiller N., «Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology», *International Migration Review*, (XXXVII), 3, 2003, pp. 576-610.

¹¹ Itzigsohn J. and Giorguli Saucedo S., «Immigrant Incorporation and Sociocultural Transnationalism», *International Migration Review*, (XXXVI), 3, 2002, pp. 766-798.

¹² Faist T., *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Spaces*, Oxford University Press, New York 2000.

networks, trade chains, and even out-and-out transnational and Diaspora communities.¹³ The implications regarding co-development are, in a certain sense, “revolutionary”:

- a) First of all, if the idea of migrants as agents of development has traditionally considered as its main target temporary migrants, *attention has now switched on Diasporas in their heterogeneous composition*¹⁴, made also of permanent migrants, individuals perfectly integrated within the hosting country, and even belonging to the second generation. All these categories can give impulse to commercial exchanges, investments and business creation, technology transfer, skills circulation and cultural crossbreeding, thanks to their knowledge of opportunities, channels and markets; to their bilingualism; and to their familiarity with laws and traditions of the different countries involved.
- b) Soliciting us to rethink the integration paradigm, transnationalism highlights that the success of the process of adaptation to host society is not enough to erode the attachment of emigrants to their country of origin. Rather, adaptation can be founded on the exploitation of the relationship with home-society. Symmetrically, *the success of the adaptation process, including the achievement of naturalization, can turn migrants (and their offsprings) into strategic actors of modernisation*. Several studies demonstrate that educational and professional success can generate the ambition to invest in transnational initiatives. In France, for example, second generations have given birth to a *bourgeoisie* who looks with interest to business opportunities on the other side of the Mediterranean, and invests capitals and competences in initiatives which impact on the communities from where their parents and grandparents left.¹⁵ Similarly, the economic take-off of Turkey has taken advantage from the investments realized by migrants living in Germany¹⁶: a country where precisely the Turkish community has showed a diffuse attitude to acquire German citizenship after the legislative reforms and an intense involvement in the political sphere. Finally, also in Italy empirical evidence demonstrates

¹³ Clifford J., *Routes: Travels and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass 1997.

¹⁴ Ionescu D., *Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for Policymakers*, International Organization for Migration, Geneva 2006.

¹⁵ Santelli E., «Les enfants d’immigrés algériens et leur pays d’origine. Modes de relations économiques et professionnelles», *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, (XV), 2, 1999, pp. 141-166.

¹⁶ Presseurop, *Lure of the Bosphorus*, Presseurop 17 November 2010, <http://www.presseurop.eu>.

that a positive attitude towards integration into host society tends to go hand in hand with an interest in being involved in co-development projects.¹⁷

In this regard we have to note how several countries, in Europe, are planning to reintroduce –or have already reintroduced– dual citizenship measures in their citizenship law. According to its partisans, dual citizenship « contributes to increased mobility and enables expatriates to maintain connections with their country of birth or heritage. Dual citizenship can also facilitate integration by encouraging immigrants to naturalize and participate politically in their own country without compromising other connections. According to this view, compulsory renunciation may not only stymie one's personal integration but also disincentive the general proneness to citizenship acquisition ».¹⁸ Looking at Table 1 we can observe how the majority of Eastern recent accession countries maintain a renunciation requirement, *while the majority of Western countries tolerate dual citizenship*. Moreover, we have to note that dual citizenship in Europe has been a policy area featured by significant changes in recent years; among the countries which have removed the renunciation requirement we can cite Italy (1992), Sweden (2001), Finland (2003) and Luxemburg (2008). Empirical evidences show that these reforms have produced a significant increase in the rates of naturalization, and that a very high percentage of naturalized immigrants have retained their first citizenship. Additionally, this process has run parallel to the definition of more objective criteria in order to assess, in a standardized manner, the parameters measuring language proficiency, the level of integration and the sharing of fundamental principles which regulate social life. Finally, these evolutions seem to acknowledge that individuals are able to simultaneously hold multiple national belongings, while in the past dual citizenship was considered as a sort of bigamous marriage. According to the network society paradigm, dual citizenship provides a facilitation of cross-borders interactions, repositioning migrants in a higher rank within the hierarchies of inequalities of the cur-

¹⁷ Zanfrini L. and Sarli A., «What are the Opportunities for Mobilizing the Filipino Diaspora in Italy? Lessons from the MAPID Project», in Baggio F. (ed.), *Brick by Brick. Building Cooperation between the Philippines and Migrants' Associations in Italy and Spain*, Scalabrini Migration Center, Manila 2010, pp. 139-253.

¹⁸ Wallace Goodman S., *Naturalisation Policies in Europe: Exploring Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion*, European University Institute – Roberto Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, November 2010; quotation at page 9.

rent global age (and consequently making them more able to play a meaningful role in the development process).

Tab. 1 – Ordinary Naturalization. Conditions regarding Length of residence, Language, Country knowledge, Integration and Renunciation

	<i>Residence</i>	<i>Language</i>	<i>Country knowledge</i>	<i>Integration</i>	<i>Renunciation</i>
Austria	10	yes	yes	yes	yes
Belgium	3	no	no	no	no
Bulgaria	5	yes	no	no	yes
Croatia	5	yes	indirect	no	yes
Cyprus	8	no	no	no	no
Czech Republic	5	yes	no	in practice	yes
Denmark	9	yes	yes	no	yes
Estonia	8	yes	yes	no	yes
Finland	6	yes	no	no	no
France	5	yes	implied	assimilation	no
Germany	8	yes	yes	vague	yes
Greece	7	yes	yes	trough language	no
Hungary	8	indirect	yes	no	no
Ireland	4	no	no	no	no
Italy	10	no	no	no	no
Latvia	5	yes	yes	no	yes
Lithuania	10	yes	yes	no	yes
Luxembourg	7	yes	yes	trough language	no
Malta	5	yes	no	participation in social activities	no
Netherlands	5	yes	yes	yes	yes
Poland	5	no	no	yes	yes
Portugal	6	yes	no	no	no
Romania	8	yes	yes	yes	no
Slovakia	8	yes	yes	?	no, with exceptions
Slovenia	10	yes	no	no	yes
Spain	10	yes	no	yes	yes
Sweden	5	no	no	no	no
United Kingdom	5	yes	yes	no	no

Source: Selection from Sara Wallace Goodman, *Naturalization Policies in Europe: Exploring Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion*, European University Institute, November 2010

- c) Permanent returns, which follow and define the success (or failure) of the migratory adventure, are only one kind of return. The latter can also be inscribed in a cyclical process of temporary returns, more or less occasional, as in the case of seasonal or circular migrations, or in the case of the so called *commuters* (that is, all categories today con-

templated by the legislation of several countries and supported by EU institutions). In broader terms, according to the transnational approach, we have to redefine the concept of “return migration”, by taking into account the socially embedded nature of migratory processes. In this perspective, the act of emigrating –and eventually the act of returning home– is inscribed in the individual and familial biography, and involves even more than one generation. In this context, *both emigration and return are components of a wider process of global mobility*. And return is no longer the “closure” of the migratory cycle, but it represents one of the possible expressions of the transnational community.¹⁹

- d) Finally, the adoption of a transnational approach favors *the overcoming of the old bipolar conception of migrations* –particularly rooted in the European legacy–, which considers migrations as a relief valve for the problems faced by sending countries, and an unwelcomed phenomenon for receiving ones. This conception does not take into account all the potentialities of migrations, which instead need to be valorized. Considering also the ethical implications of this issue,²⁰ we have to look at *the opportunities to manage the costs and benefits related to migrations in a global perspective, focusing the attention on the dynamics existing before migration and after return, with the awareness that the measures adopted on one side of the migratory process will inevitably reflect on the other side, in the brief and in the long term*. The old, bilateral conception manifests itself through migratory policies based on a unilateral approach, depicted as a “national” issue and with a strong emphasis on the dimensions of entries’ control and of integration in new societies. On the contrary, according to the new conception, *transnational cooperation is no longer understood as the point of mediation between two “disputers” –sending and destination countries– but as the seal of an alliance between two stakeholders sharing common interests*. Social policies and policies of cooperation become the two sides of the same coin. This idea is acknowledged also by EU institutions, as we shall see further on [§ 5]. Moreover, in this light, it emerges a semantic extension of the idea of co-development, which contemplates migrants’ contribution not only to the growth of origin communities, but also of receiving societies [§ 7].

¹⁹ King R., “Generalizations from the History of Return Migration...”, above quoted.

²⁰ Baggio F. and Zanfrini L., *Migration Management and Ethics: Envisioning a Different Approach*, Polimetrika International Scientific Publisher, Monza 2006.

4. Future prospects: a lesson from the local development model

A very precious lesson, for all those involved in the co-development issue, could come from the “rediscovery” of the lesson provided by the phenomenon of *local development*.

The concept of local development was beget and cultivated particularly by the Italian sociology; actually, it represents one of its most significant inheritances to the European and world-wide economic sociology.²¹ We can certainly state that it is thanks to the experience of Italian local societies (Italy was not by chance defined as the country with a thousand bell towers) that the idea of local development has acquired an undisputable popularity at European level. This idea has in fact been incorporated in all institutional schemes aimed at supporting development, including those in the realm of co-development (that are planned on a transnational scale, but often launched by local actors and aimed at fulfilling needs emerging on a local level). Indeed, the popularity gained by the idea of local development is definitely linked to the revolutionary and seductive goal of *giving back the chance and the task to rein development to local communities and local actors. In this perspective, civil society is the primary actor responsible for the growth of its territory, playing a role even more important than the one plaid by governmental institutions.*

For a long time, since the end of the second world war until the 1970s –during the so called “Glorious Thirties”, a period particularly crucial for the modernization of the western world– theories and practices of development had assigned a negligible role to both the local dimension and socio-cultural factors. The latter were even interpreted as potential obstacles to social change and to the success of policies aimed to sustain development.²² The hegemonic view affirmed the idea of a straight and continuous process of development, whose final output would be the convergence of marginalized territories into the trajectory of most advanced economies. If the type of envisaged development was everywhere the same, the policies aimed to promote it were uniform. Such a kind of approach inspired both the interventions realized in the least advanced European regions (such as southern Italy) and the policies of internation-

²¹ Zanfrini L., «Economic sociology and the study of local societies», in Rovati G. (ed.), *Italian Sociology in the Nineties*, FrancoAngeli, Milan 1998, pp. 167-208.

²² Trigilia C., *Sociologia economica. Stato, mercato e società nel capitalismo moderno*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1998.

al cooperation addressed to underdeveloped nations, implicitly based on the hope of their progressive “civilization” according to European and American standards. Precisely the fact of having ignored the peculiarity of each local social and institutional context is the main cause of the disastrous appraisal of this first great season of policies for development; and of the subsequent dissolving of the initial optimism.

The local development model, on the contrary, *identifies exactly in endogenous factors, related to the characteristics of the social, cultural and politico-institutional context, the reasons of an unexpected and spontaneous growth*. The idea of a development based on the State intervention (or anyway on a top-down exogenous intervention) in order to start and sustain the process of industrialization) *gave way to the opportunity to mobilize endogenous factors, and even “pre-modern”/traditional factors, able to trigger a self-propelling process of growth*. Based on the experience of local societies, rich of small and medium enterprises spontaneously created by local actors –the so called “*Italia di mezzo*”²³ (median Italy) or “*Terza Italia*”²⁴ (Third Italy)–, where the process of modernization registered a series of anomalies with respect to the hypothesis of urban-industrial paradigm, the community environment started to be described as the perfect humus where aspects such as *trust* and *social capital* could sediment, generating a context where economic relations can easily develop. The rich set of studies devoted to the Third Italy and to its particular economic organizational pattern –the *industrial district*²⁵– represent a sort of divide in the conceptualization of the process of development and underdevelopment. The relevance of the social, cultural and institutional foundations of economic actions, as well as their territorial diversification, will no longer be ignored.²⁶ This point is clearly demonstrated by the numerous research works aimed at exploring the historical and contemporary reasons which make a territory more or less competitive, more or less able to generate new entrepreneurs, more or less capable to conjugate economic growth and social cohesion. Therefore, the spatial dimension has acquired rich potentialities for explaining the process of development, representing the place where historical, social and cultural factors, mutually interrelated and able to generate heterogeneous patterns of development, have been deposited. Moreover, it is at local level that

²³ Muscara C., *La geografia dello sviluppo*, Edizioni di Comunità, Milan 1967.

²⁴ Bagnasco A., *Tre Italie. La problematica dello sviluppo italiano*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1977.

²⁵ Becattini G., *Distretti industriali e made in Italy. Le basi socioculturali del nostro sviluppo economico*, Bollati Boringhieri, Tourin 1998.

²⁶ Zanfrini L., *Lo sviluppo condiviso. Un progetto per le società locali*, Vita & Pensiero, Milan 2001.

it is possible to organize the cooperation among the various actors and to link market forces with the forms of social regulation.

This last point deserves to be stressed, as it represents a sort of *trait d'union* between the literature flourished around the idea of local development, on the one side, and our current reflection on the co-development issue, on the other. Actually, representing a context of connection between market forces and forms of social regulation, the territory was destined to reveal unexpected potentialities for: *a) the local actors' mobilization* (from the idea of exogenous development to the idea of *endogenous development*); *b) the elaboration of projects* (from the idea of development as a destiny to the idea of development as a plan); *c) the assumption of collective responsibilities*, according to the perspective of social and environmental sustainability (from the local development model to the *shared development* model). Actually, the epilogue of more than 30 years of analysis and studies around the issue of local development is the awareness that territorial growth, and first of all its compatibility with inclusiveness, democracy, sustainability in the long term, is essentially linked to *organizational factors and with processes of collective learning*. As a consequence, the concept of *territorial quality*²⁷ has become a recurrent topic in the analysis devoted to development and competitiveness, inspiring further studies and researches converging in the category of local development, rich of suggestions for our present reflection. Indeed, as has been seen [§ 2], also the inquiry on the relationship between migrations and development, once cleared by ideological backwashes, lead up to the same conclusion: *human mobility and development are not deterministically linked, nor positively nor negatively, but all depends on the quality of the involved territories and on the capacity to govern these processes according to a cooperative approach*.

²⁷ Zanfrini L., *Lo sviluppo condiviso...*, above quoted.

Tab. 2 – Comparison between different development theories

<i>Elements</i>	<i>Top-down Development</i>	<i>Development from below</i>	<i>Shared Development</i>	<i>Co-development</i>
Processes	Straight, evolutionary	Discontinuous, negotiated	Incremental, concerted	Incremental, generative
Duration	Brief-medium term	Medium-long term	Long term	Long term
Objectives	Technical and productive	Economic and social	Economic, social and cultural	Economic, social, cultural and political
Interests	Exogenous	Endogenous	Endogenous but projected towards a supra-local level	“Transnational”
Interventions	Sector-based, homogeneous	Integrated, heterogeneous	Integrated, multi-dimensional	Integrated also at transnational level, holistic
Actors	Institutional	Social	Economic, social and institutional	Economic, social, and institutional
Aims	Modernization	Valorisation of local resources	Sustainable and self-propelling development	Sustainable and self-propelling development of both the sending and the receiving communities
Local actors’ role	Passive	Active	Promotional and receptive	Promotional, receptive and connecting

Source: Laura Zanfrini, *Lo sviluppo condiviso. Un progetto per le società locali*, Vita & Pensiero, Milan 2001 (first 4 columns)

This observation must not lead us to pessimistic conclusions, with the consequence of condemning to perpetual underdevelopment those societies which lack of civicness, a good administration and a diffuse habit to trustful cooperation. The basic idea is that what makes a local society different from another is «*the local actors’ differential ability to develop cooperative strategies, to mobilize latent local resources and to attract other resources from outside, to network our own town with other towns, to plan development and disseminate it*».²⁸ Drawing on the innovation theories it is actually possible to affirm that productive innovations, the same as social innovations, have very infrequently an individualistic matrix. Of course some individuals (also among migrants and former migrants) have better capabilities than others, and in particular are more able to play a leadership role. *But a process of growth and development, in order to be self-propelling,*

²⁸ Perulli P., *Atlante metropolitano. Il mutamento sociale nelle grandi città*, Il Mulino, Bologna 1992; quotation at pag. 118.

must have a collective nature and take advantage of multiple contributions, looking at the wellbeing of future generations, according to the generative approach. On the other hand, even innovations to be applied to productive processes tend to be realized, in the current post-fordist scenario, according to an incremental logic. Moreover *productive innovation is strictly linked to social innovation, that is, the capability of inventing and adopting new form of cooperation*²⁹: generating and reproducing trust resources –particularly in contexts deeply featured by distrust, bad government, corruption and subordination to external interests– must therefore constitute a crucial component of every initiative in this field. Finally, the real discriminating factor is represented by the capability of mobilizing local actors and of interiorizing resources and information available in the external environment. Not necessarily these characteristics are comprised in the “historical” equipment of a given territory; *to a large extent they can also be created thanks to good planning competences and a shared proneness to bet on collective goals.* Local actors, in this scenario, have a chance to influence their own destiny, through an aware political action and valorizing cooperation as an economic resource.³⁰ Obviously, in this process of local actors’ mobilization, migrants and returned migrants have a strategic role to play, particularly where migration has represented the occasion to grapple with practices of democratic participation and to learn new competences applicable in both the productive and the reproductive sphere.

However, co-development initiatives promoted in receiving communities show some recurrent crucial elements, above and beyond the variety of their proponents and of their aims. These elements [Box 1] seem to echo the typical lexicon of projects of local development: for example, they are generally inspired by needs emerging at local level, but tend to open themselves to the transnational context, looking for effective solutions; they demonstrate a capability to put together the various resources of a given territory, with an emphasis on the construction of partnerships and alliances; they tend to adopt a promotional approach, looking at migrants not only as “welfare’ consumers”, but as very providers of social development.³¹

²⁹ Gordon R., «Les entrepreneurs, l’entreprise et les fondements sociaux de l’innovation», *Sociologie du Travail*, (XXXI), 1, 1989, pp. 107-124.

³⁰ Trigilia C., *Sociologia economica...*, quoted.

³¹ Pastore F., «Europe, Migration and Development. Critical remarks on an emerging policy field», *Development*, vol. 50.4, 2007, pp. 56-62; Piperno F. and Tognetti Bordogna M., *Welfare transnazionale. La frontiera esterna delle politiche sociali*, Ediesse, Rome 2012.

Box 1 – The Italian experience: strengths of the initiatives implemented in the field of co-development

Focusing on the local dimension and on the needs emerging at local level

Involvement of the Diaspora and of migrants' associations

Integration with policies promoting migrants' integration

Attention to the educational dimension

Propelling role played by local administrations and by Italian civil society's organizations

Ability to involve different local actors and resources, emphasis on the building of partnerships and alliances

Emphasis on the process of co-building and the mobilization "from-below" of local citizens, migrants and left behind families

Involvement of the authorities of sending countries and communities

Integration with the policies of development implemented by sending country's authorities

Finally, once acknowledged the *intentional component* of development processes, we have to highlight the *cultural dimension*, –or even the *pedagogical dimension*– of the initiatives aimed to promote development. In this light, the experiences acquired by migrants in hosting countries –such as their involvement in trade unions activities or in philanthropic associations, and of course their engagement in transnational projects– must be considered as fundamental steps. Indeed these experiences are essential to promote a more mature relationship with the hosting community, but also to learn new competences and skills (related, for example, to the management of the claims coming from different stakeholders, to the definition of the common wellbeing, to the involvement of other actors, to the designing and sharing of the rules of conduct, or to evaluation procedures). In this concern, the opportunity emerges *to devote special attention to the training needs of subjects to be involved in co-development projects*, sometimes excessively concentrated on material and financial aspects. The project presented in Box 2 provides a good example of an initiative largely insisting on this particular dimension.

Box 2 – MAPID – Capacity building of Migrants’ Associations in Italy and Spain and of Government Institutions in the Philippines to Promote Development

The International Mapid project was carried out by the Scalabrini Migration Center of Manila, the Commission of Filipinos Overseas, the University of Valencia and the Fondazione ISMU of Milan, within the European community program Aeneas [Grant Contract No. MIG R/2007/130-548(11)].

The objectives of the Mapid project were: *i)* to advance the understanding of the migration-development nexus among migrants’ associations in Italy and Spain and institutions in the Philippines as a key factor in promoting national and local development; and *ii)* to promote cooperation between migrants’ associations and national and local institutions in the Philippines.

By means of a three-year plan of research, training and sharing of best practices, Mapid has set out to reinforce the planning capacity of Filipino associations in Italy and Spain and of the government agencies in the Philippines, and to offer operational indications to the different stakeholders involved in the challenge of co-development.

All information about Mapid can be found on the project website: <http://www.smc.org.ph/MAPID/mapid.html>. On this website it is also possible to download most of the material produced during the project.

The volume *Brick by Brick: Building Cooperation between the Philippines and Overseas Filipinos in Italy and Spain*, edited by Fabio Baggio, Scalabrini Migration Center, Quezon City, contains the results and reflections emerged from the Mapid experience.

5. Future prospects: inputs from the European Union

As already mentioned, all the evolutions and new perspectives which have transformed the conceptual framework of co-development since the beginning of the new millennium are part of the reflection conducted on an EU, institutional level and are mirrored in EU documents and statements.

The opening, in the late 1990s, of new dialogue and cooperation channels between European countries and sending and transit countries is certainly linked to the substantial failure of the previous unilateral and securitarian approach. Within a landscape still characterized by security and control issues, a new phase of external projection of European migration policies has been launched.

During the Tampere European Council in 1999, the importance was acknowledged of inter-connecting migration and development policies, and of strengthening cooperation between sending, transit and receiving countries for the management of migration flows. The Commission’s Communication 703/2002, *Integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations with Third Countries*, states that migration is to be considered, rather than as a threat, as a drive for development in European and other countries involved. This approach is reaffirmed by the

Commission's Communication 390/2005, *Migration and Development: some concrete orientations*, where the integration between migration policies and policies of cooperation is presented as a strategy to maximize migration positive impact for both sending and destination countries. In the Commission's Communication 621/2005, *Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court*, this perspective is further specified, through an emphasis on the need to integrate, through a comprehensive and coherent approach, migration policies, external policies and policies of cooperation.³² This is the basis of the *Global Approach to Migration* (GAM), which developed, in the following years, through a series of communications diffused by the Commission³³ and encouraging the reinforcement of synergies and the enlargement of partnerships with new regions.

Through these strategic documents, indications and guidelines,, the migration and development nexus has started to penetrate into the European approach even if, at least at the beginning, in a very narrow way: international cooperation for development was initially viewed as a strategy to face the "root causes" of migration –understood as a consequence of a situation of poverty– and to reach the goal of reducing migratory pressure. In a few years, at least at formal level, this kind of approach has progressively given the way to the migration hump thesis. According to the latter, as already mentioned, it is recognized how development, at least in its initial phases, can even increase the propensity to emigrate [§ 2]. Substantially, the European discourse has passed from the logic "more development for less migration" to the logic "better migration for more development". The ambition is that of achieving, thanks to policies conceived according to a transnational logic, a "triple win" scenario: for migrants, for their origin countries, and for destination countries.³⁴

In 2011, following the "Arab Spring", the Commission's Communication 743/2011, *Global Approach to Migration and Mobility* (GAMM), updates the original global approach to migration, initially constituted by three pillars: facilitating regular mobility, preventing irregular

³² Piperno F. and Tognetti Bordogna M., *Welfare transnazionale...*, above quoted.

³³ Cfr. COM (2006) 735, *The Global Approach to Migration One Year on: Towards a Comprehensive European Migration Policy*; COM (2007) 247, *Applying the Global Approach to Migration to the Eastern and South-Eastern Regions Neighbouring the European Union*; COM (2008) 611, *Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration: Increasing coordination, coherence and synergies*; SEC (2011) 1172, *Increasing Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change*.

³⁴ Pastore F., "More development for less migration" or "Better migration for more development"? *Shifting priorities in the European debate*, MigraCtion - Periodical analysis bulletin on migration policies in Europe, Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2003, <http://www.cespi.it/bollMigracion/MigSpecial3.PDF>.

migration and maximizing the migration development impact. A fourth pillar was added to this initial frame, that is, promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum policy. This Communication underlines the intention to consider migration not only as a security issue, but as a theme calling into question human rights, integration, the management of regular flows, and a new neighboring policy aimed to promote the economic development of the countries involved.³⁵ This document highlights the need to achieve a better integration with the EU external policy and with cooperation to development, and to promote a better coherence with external policy objectives, particularly those defined by the European strategy 2020. We are dealing with the aim of making the European space an attractive destination for talents; of concentrating on the mobility and visa policy, and of reinforcing migrants' autonomy and their rights in the origin, transit and destination countries. The importance of promoting the portability of social and security rights and of facilitating the recognition of qualifications obtained abroad is stressed as a crucial aspect of the migration and development nexus. The idea emerges that transnational networks of services could promote migrants' socio-economic integration and reintegration, during emigration or in case of return.³⁶

In this concern, it is worth noting how recent evolutions in the EU perspective consider integration dynamics as interconnected with the migration and development nexus and as a process which can take advantage of cooperation with sending countries. The Commission's Communication 455/2011, *A European Agenda for the integration of Third-Country Nationals* acknowledges, for the first time, the sending countries' crucial role in the promotion of integration in receiving countries. Integration is described as a transnational process to be supported by these countries before departure, during the stay abroad and after return.

In the same line, the Commission's Communication 292/2013, *Maximizing the Development Impact of Migration*, is formulated. The latter aims at providing a basis for a common stance of the Union and the member states in the occasion of the High-level dialogue promoted by the

³⁵ Carrera S., den Hertog L. and Parkin J., *EU Migration Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. What prospects for EU-Southern Mediterranean Relations?*, MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15, August 2012, www.medpro-foresight.eu; Denaro S., *L'Europa e l'immigrazione: norme, politiche e prospettive future*, BloGlobal 2013, <http://www.bloglobal.net/2013/05/leuropa-e-limmigrazione-norme-politiche-e-prospettive-future.html>.

³⁶ Piperno F., *Migration and Development in the policies of the European Union: trends toward a cosmopolitan approach*, 2014 CeSPI Policy Paper. <http://www.cespi.it/PDF/Piperno-Paper%20ActionAid%202015.pdf>

UN general assembly in October 2013. The priorities identified in this document include: to guarantee that development strategies assume that migration and mobility are factors of development, to pay better attention to the interconnections between climate change, environmental degradation and migration; to acknowledge the challenges that urban regions have to face because of migration and the increasing urbanization; to reinforce migration governance through bilateral and regional cooperation, involving also civil society; to favor labor mobility at both international and regional level; to extend the traditional interventions on migration and development also in South-South contexts; and to respect migrants' dignity and protect their fundamental rights notwithstanding their judicial status. The latter aspect is particularly interesting as it implies that migrants' rights are not seen as linked to a national membership or territorial belonging, but, rather, as pertaining to the individual, conceived in a transnational perspective and mainstreamed through the whole migration cycle.³⁷

The Commission's Communication 44/2015, *A Global Partnership for Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development after 2015*, defines the main principles, objectives and strategies that, in the view of the EU Commission, should guide the global partnership in supporting the post-2015 development agenda. In the EU Commission's perspective, the latter should be global and universal, incorporating all three components of sustainable development: social, economic and environmental. Meaningfully this document indicates the promotion of a positive impact of migration as one of the key strategies in this concern. Strengthened partnerships among states and other stakeholders are described as necessary for a better migration governance, able to foster an effective management of migration with full respect for migrants' rights and dignity. The international community is invited to work collaboratively for developing a comprehensive strategy for addressing both legal and irregular migration in origin, transit and receiving countries, within the framework of an international, shared responsibility. Some priorities are identified, such as reducing remittances and recruitment costs, claiming the portability of earned social security benefits and unleashing migrants' full potential by promoting the recognition of their skills and qualifications, while fighting discrimination.

This concept is reinforced in the Commission's Communication 240/2015, *A European Agenda on Migration*, which affirms that migration-related targets should be included in the Sustaina-

³⁷ Piperno F., *Migration and Development in the policies of the European Union...*, quoted above.

ble Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations and mainstreamed into key development sectors. This communication is launched as a reaction to the migration crisis and the increasing number of human tragedies occurring at the EU external borders, due to the recent geopolitical events featuring the North African and Middle East regions. Therefore this document provides a series of recommendations for an immediate, more effective answer from the EU to this dramatic situation. However, describing migration as a challenge and an opportunity for destination and origin countries, it also contains some guidelines for a better management of migration in the medium and long term, through a balanced and comprehensive approach able to improve the links between migration and external policies, including development policies, and to foster greater internal and external cooperation. The potential role of migration in the EU economic and societal development is emphasized, in relation to the long-term challenges Europe is facing, in particular due to an ageing population and an economy increasingly dependent on highly-skilled jobs. On this basis, one of the priorities identified in this agenda is the need to attract qualified migrant workers whose skills are necessary for the EU economy, particularly by facilitating entry and the recognition of qualifications and competences. With regard to the connection between migration and the development of sending countries, this agenda indicates the importance of promoting an ethical recruitment in sectors suffering from a lack of qualified workers in countries of origin, and to support regional labour mobility schemes encouraging South-South mobility, following the example of the EU single market, and considered as able to bring an important contribution to local development.

All the over mentioned documents, recommendations and guidelines testify a meaningful evolution in the EU perspective on the migration and development nexus. Nevertheless, there seem to exist a relevant gap between rhetoric and practice in this field. EU actual operational strategies and policies still tend to be featured by a security-based approach. Mobility partnerships, presented by EU institutions as the most complete framework for bilateral cooperation between the EU and its partner countries within the framework of the GAMM, continue to revolve around the principle of conditionality, according to which development in Third Countries is exchanged against migration control. The relationships between the EU and partner countries tend to remain asymmetric and the idea of pursuing common objectives for the fulfillment of mutual interests is rarely translated into practice. Within this context, the issue of

human and social rights tends to remain in the shadow, while economic growth is more often at the core of EU measures aimed at promoting the potential of migration for development. For this reason, a transformation would be necessary in EU actual practice in the field of migration and development, able to produce a shift from a securitarian to a migrant-centered and right-based approach.³⁸

6. Persistence of the original sin... some critical knots in the current European approach

The lesson to be learned, in the light of the several perspectives above reviewed, can be summarized as follows: more than a migration deterrent and a stimulus for “voluntary” returns (according to a logic less and less admitted but often underpinning the various programs implemented), *co-development policies must be considered as an instrument to support the management of human mobility and of integration processes, with the aim to exploit migration positive impacts for both sending and receiving societies*. Despite this hope, there are several critical elements which recall what has above been defined the “original sin” of the European legacy.

First of all, this “sin” manifests itself through *migratory policies which continue to shade, at least formally, the temporary residence model, anchoring migrants’ right to stay to their occupational condition, coherently with the assumption of the complementary role that they are supposed to play* (“migrants are useful as long as they do the jobs that native workers no longer want to do”). Impacting with low universalistic labor markets –such as those of Southern European countries– this kind of approach feeds their segmentation according to ethnic cleavages and migrants concentration in the least innovative and efficient sectors. As a consequence, both migrants’ human capital development and earning capacity are inhibited, together with their potential contribution to the growth of their origin countries. At the same time, migrants are “curbed” in a weak legal status that, paradoxically, inhibits their mobility: as a matter of fact, since return represents an irreversible option, it becomes less probable. Besides, such an approach tends to

³⁸ ECDPPM - ICMPD, *Migration and Development Policies and Practices. A mapping study of eleven European Countries and the European Commission*, SDC, Bern, 2013; Ruby G., *The migration-development nexus: time for a paradigm shift*, Notre Europe - Eliamap, February 2013.

create “unbalanced” integration models in which the economic (working) dimension is over-emphasized compared to the others. Not incidentally, the most “integrated” migrants communities, characterized by high employability and strong adaptability to labor shortages, risk, because of these traits, to be relegated to the fringe of public life, confined to ethnically connoted environments that certainly do not sustain their aptitude to be actively involved in social, cultural and political life.³⁹ Actually, the available inquiries⁴⁰ stress, beside other factors, the potential role of migrants’ associations to act as gatekeepers for new migrants’ activism. Through more effective ways for facing the challenges of integration, they would probably pave the path for a more active and intense participation. In particular migrants’ associations should define more clearly their objectives and improve their competence and the professionalization of their members. Moreover, they should find a way to act as spokespersons on behalf of migrants, without claiming to be equivalents of democratic representatives. Moreover, in order to foster the participation of migrants in mainstream organizations it would be crucial to promote training and awareness-raising activities, particularly addressed to leaders and to those members who may represent the first contact with non nationals. More broadly, this would help also to broaden civic participation in European societies: the phenomenon of immigrant activism can be instructive for the inclusion of native population groups underrepresented in specific organizations, e.g. people with a working class background: an organizational approach designed to improve the inclusion of immigrants has the potential to raise the general capacity of civic associations to acquire new members, hence being useful for society as a whole.

Finally, it is necessary to “reinvent” the current integration model, as a crucial step not only to promote a better quality of interethnic relations, but also to favor migrants’ contribution to the development of sending societies.⁴¹ This transformation, desirable result of a circular process active both in ethnic communities and in the autochthonous population, could have a twofold value: i) on the one side, it may foster a more “mature” relation of migrant population with receiving society institutions, so as to lead the former to play an active role in promoting the integration pro-

³⁹ See Zanfrini L. and Sarli A., *Migrants’ Associations and Philippine Institutions for Development (First year activity). Italian Report*, “Quaderni-ISMU”, Milan, Fondazione ISMU, n. 1, 2009.

⁴⁰ POLITIS - *Building Europe with New Citizens? An Inquiry into the Civic Participation of Naturalised Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 Countries*, www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe

⁴¹ Zanfrini L. (ed.), *The Diversity Value. How to Reinvent the European Approach to Immigration*, McGraw-Hill Education, Maidenhead, UK 2015.

cess in the community of residence; ii) secondly, it may enhance, among natives, an image of immigrants as subjects who do not shirk the duty of participation and who take responsibilities also on a collective level. In this perspective, in addition to their participation in the receiving society's labor market, *migrants' contribution to public life in terms of civic consciousness, social engagement and political activism would be appreciated and encouraged*, so as to foster migrants' role as potential agents of development. The project presented in Box 3 provides an example of an initiative conceived with the specific aim of "reinventing" the European approach to immigration.

Box 3 – DIVERSE. Diversity Improvement as a Viable Enrichment Resource for Society and Economy

This project, supported by the European Commission (Grant Agreement No. HOME/2012/EIFX/CA/CFP/4248 *30-CE-0586564/00-20) and coordinated by the research centre WWELL of the Catholic University of Milan, was realized in cooperation with 14 partners – included the ISMU Foundation – in 10 EU countries (Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden). It intended to fill the knowledge gaps, provide shared points of reference, and increase awareness of the advantages of Diversity Management practices implemented by profit, public and non-profit organizations.

The overall and long-term aim of the project was to "reinvent" the European approach to immigration, resolving the historical paradox generated by the attempt to keep together two contradictory logics⁴²: the "economicistic" logic on which the system of entry (and stay) is regulated and the logic of solidarity and equal opportunities. Actually, on the one hand the European countries approach to the governance of migrations is traditionally characterized by an emphasis on the working dimension: this is pivotal for the social acceptance of TCNs presence, nurturing the view of a complementariness between autochthonous and foreign work, and thus favoring migrants' concentration in low-skilled and low-status jobs. At the same time, European countries –consistently with their historical focus on human rights– have formally extended an ample set of protections, rights and opportunities to foreign workers and their family members, with the result of transforming "temporary migrant workers" into "semi-citizens" (or *denizens*⁴³).

For overcoming this paradox, three major changes are necessary, which constitute the challenges addressed by DIVERSE: a) shifting from the perception of migrants as contingently instrumental resources to the conception of their human capital as a structural resource for the economic and social development of European societies; b) promoting a wider awareness, among different types of organizations, of the importance and potentialities of Diversity Management strategies; c) improving the social participation and the civic engagement of TCNs (and especially their participation in voluntary nonprofit organizations) for the construction of an inclusive European society and in order to change their common perception as people who need to be helped and assisted. The basic assumption, which inspired the complex set of tasks promoted by the project is the awareness that a real and sustainable change in the attitudes towards TCNs, able to exploit their potential, needs the active involvement of different stakehold-

⁴² Zanfrini L., *Immigrazione e diritto di cittadinanza: il paradosso storico della vicenda europea*, "Libertà civili", n. 2, 2011, pp. 117-122.

⁴³ Hammar T. (ed.), *European Immigration Policy*, Cambridge University Press, New York 1985.

ers and the implementation of different kinds of actions.

A detailed presentation of the project, of its results and of the rich set of materials produced can be found in www.ismu.org/diverse.

The final volume is freely accessible at <http://www.ateneonline.it/zanfrini/>

Another critical point concerns the *management of mobility*. As we have seen [§ 5], at least formally, the European approach has been featured, in the last years, by several crucial evolutions: *i)* the securitarian logic has given the way to an understanding of migration as an instrument for a parallel development at the two poles of the migratory process; *ii)* the traditional unilateral approach has given the way to a global approach in the management of human mobility; *iii)* migration, development, external and development policies, in the past conceived as disconnected, are today depicted as mutually intermingled. Nonetheless, as already mentioned [§ 5], several scholars note how these evolutions substantially involve only the level of political discourse, of formal statements and of rhetorical declarations, whereas they rarely shape the concrete policies implementation.⁴⁴ This is due, first of all, to the states' will to strictly maintain the control of migratory fluxes, despite the hesitant steps towards a *comunitarizzazione* of migratory policies. For this reason, EU member states can choose to apply EU guidelines concerning the migration and development nexus with different intensities and nuances.⁴⁵ The widespread tendency to interpret the support to the development of origin countries as a currency of exchange to obtain their cooperation in migration control ends up in the downplaying of the official EU declarations regarding the symmetric participation of origin and hosting countries in the management of mobility and in the promotion of integration. On the other side, within a context more and more characterized by security concerns, even the initiatives in the co-development field ends up by fulfilling receiving countries interests, at the

⁴⁴ Weinar A., *EU Cooperation Challenges in External Migration Policy, EU-US Immigration Systems*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 2011, www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications.

⁴⁵ Maggi J., Sarr D., Green E., Sarrasin O. and Ferro A., «Migrations transnationales sénégalaises, intégration et développement. Le rôle des associations de la diaspora à Milan, Paris et Genève», *Sociograph*, 15, 2009, www.unige.ch/ses/socio/publications/dernierespublications/sociograph15.html; Marini F., «Immigrants and transnational engagement in the diaspora: Ghanaian associations in Italy and the UK», *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal*, (6), 2, 2013, pp. 131-144; <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17528631.2013.793134#.Uvt9bPu0MXc>

expenses of sending countries, due to the transformation of the declared solidarism of co-development policies into simple rhetoric.⁴⁶

Concerning this kind of issue, some important recommendations come from the POLITIS project⁴⁷. Active migrants involved in the project suggested that the success of policies depends not only on their contents and methods, but also on the public discourse taking place during the policy making phase and afterwards. A respectful discourse in which migrants are invited to contribute to the common wellbeing is favorable for encouraging their engagement in all fields of receiving societies. Moreover, immigrants should not only be consulted on integration policies, but also with regard to efforts to enforce migration restrictions, prevent illegal entrance and ensure the return of foreign nationals without valid documents. Within a general trend towards more restrictive migration policies and more consistent enforcement, the danger exists that a public discourse featuring immigrants as threats could lead to unnecessary restrictions in laws, to the implementation, on the part of authorities, of practices aimed at discriminatory control, and to exclusionary attitudes on the part of native populations. Such tendencies are deeply deplored by active immigrants. The inclusion of immigrants can be promoted by the elimination of unnecessary restrictions for foreign nationals, by transparent and short naturalization procedures and consultative structures that are adjusted to country-specific conditions. Moreover, EU member states should examine whether in their context migrants have the possibility to access credit, insurance schemes and other financial services, in order to identify inhibiting factors (if any) and work for their elimination. In spite of restrictive migration control policies, Europe is perceived by a considerable number of migrants as a symbol or model for diversity, for its capability to recognize various identities and to develop cooperation between different states. At the same time, migrants raise issues of exclusion, violence and unfair treatment. Moreover, they underline the positive role of EU policies contrasting discrimination, but they also observe that equal treatment does not sufficiently cover Third Country nationals. It is therefore important that the European Parliament supports initiatives promoting equality and the inclusion of Third Country nationals in policies against discrimination.

⁴⁶ Nyberg Sørensen N., «Revisiting the Migration-Development Nexus...», above quoted.

⁴⁷ POLITIS - *Building Europe with New Citizens? An Inquiry into the Civic Participation of Naturalised Citizens and Foreign Residents in 25 Countries*, www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe

To these set of suggestions I want to add the need to involve migrants, together with associations in both sending and receiving countries, in the rehabilitation of the sense of legality. While condemning the securitarian drift and the draconian solutions sometimes adopted by EU and EU countries in their fight against irregular migration, the responsibility should also be considered of individuals and families involved in migration processes, often slaves of behaviour patterns and emulation yearnings which make migration a desirable solution, regardless of its price and its consequences for the dignity of persons. It is precisely in the name of the principle of human dignity that, in my opinion, a critical reflection would be necessary about the affirmation of a certain “culture of migration”, which makes the latter the only solution strategy for various difficult situations, and contributes to institutionalize reprehensible behaviours and practices, often involving the most vulnerable people. In many circumstances, victims of smuggling are even reduced to accomplices of their exploiters, and phenomena decidedly prejudicial to the respect of human rights become socially and culturally accepted practices. It must also be acknowledged that when individual migrants make improper use of entry procedures they contribute to the degradation of the sense of legality, to the downsizing of the resources available for the reception of “real” forced migrants, and to the delegitimation of policies addressed to voluntary migrants. This will be then a complex challenge for all organizations working in the field of migration.

Finally, we have to mention what has been defined the risk of *an ideologically driven neoliberal “optimism”*,⁴⁸ that shifts the attention away from structural constraints and the responsibility of governmental elites, rhetorically celebrating the idea of a development “from-below”, spurred from migrants initiatives and nurtured by market forces. The celebration of migrants’ role and their patriotism allows the authorities of sending countries to disregard their duty of creating work and life opportunities for their own citizens, and the authorities of receiving countries to legitimize policies obedient to their own interests. This rhetoric neglects an empirical datum often observed in practice: rather than representing a consequence of migrants’ returns and investments, development constitutes their prerequisite. Not by chance, migrants (and their offspring) can give their major contribution within the framework of dynamic economies. On the contrary, «if states fail to implement reforms, migration and remittances are unlikely to fuel national development – and can even feed situations of dependency, underdevelopment and

⁴⁸ De Haas H., “The Migration and Development Pendulum..”, above quoted.

authoritarianism».⁴⁹ Hence it is necessary to stress the *responsibilities of the sending countries' authorities*. Whilst closing their eyes on the phenomena of smuggling and trafficking, they sometimes neglect all those areas of political intervention that can contribute to the fight against trafficking of human beings and to offer viable alternatives to migration. Often, it is the authorities in these countries that, through the rhetoric of the migrant –described as a national hero who sacrifices him/herself for the welfare of the family and community of origin– disregard the mandate of ensuring a government attentive to sustainability of growth and development. Instead of “buying” sending countries’ authorities cooperation in the implementation of questionable practices to contrast irregular migration, EU institutions should therefore promote their role in the process of endogenous development.

7. Transnational migrants’ contribution to the development of European societies

I wish to conclude by introducing a semantic extension of the concept of co-development, describing how *migrants, as transnational actors, can concur to the development of destination societies*. Particularly, beside those fields where their role is already largely acknowledged (the labor market, where they are expected to fill job vacancies, and the entrepreneurial system, where they have been emerging thanks to their particular activism), I want to focus the attention on less obvious but equally crucial aspects, as far as the future of European society is concerned.

- a) A first aspect concerns the role that migrants can play in order to make our national economies more competitive, *by the adoption, among different kinds of organizations, of diversity management (DM) practices*. This expression describes a set of experiences aimed at creating “inclusive organizations”, *transforming factors specific to some groups of people into an added value for the organizational performance* (for example enriching its problem solving capability, or its ability to understand and fulfill the needs and expectations coming from different categories of customers; or to recruit new talents [see Box 3]).
- b) Migrants, involuntary protagonists of a growing debate about their right to access welfare provisions, may be an extraordinary resource for the rethinking of the European

⁴⁹ De Haas H., “The Migration and Development Pendulum..”, above quoted, quotation at pag. 19.

welfare regimes, which are nowadays facing a strong financial crises, but also a crises of consensus and legitimacy. The immigration history is, first of all, very instructive in *unveiling the limits of a formalistic conception of citizenship and of the principle of equality*. Even when the politico-social compromise has arrived at solutions that are apparently more inclusive –for example the incorporation of migrants into the community of nationals, or the equalisation of foreigners and citizens concerning access to social rights, or even the recognition of specific needs that require *ad hoc* solutions– migrants and those belonging to ethnic minorities are, with few exceptions, overrepresented, in most EU countries, in the categories at risk of exclusion (such as school drop-outs unemployed persons, or elderly people with no adequate income). However, the rich set of existing studies make us conscious that there do not exist any kind of determinism; moreover, migrants and ethnic minorities must not be described as aprioristically problematic and penalized categories. Even if racism and institutional discrimination do exist, an unprejudiced analysis shows the social roots of most problems of disadvantage and social exclusion in contemporary European society. This makes migrants and their children a paradigmatic example of the failure of the promise to render our society more equal, not only formally, but also substantially. Furthermore, *immigration highlights the limits of our national welfare systems in answering the needs of individuals and families whose biographies are inscribed in a transnational space*⁵⁰. The existential trajectories of migrants, who first and deeply experience these limits, predict a kind of situation that will more and more frequently involve the European population as a whole; but it also permits to identify the possible solutions, according to the prospective of a transnationalisation of social policies. Actually in the last years, migrants' associations (often in cooperation with mainstream European associations) have conceived and launched several projects able to overcome national borders in their attempt to answer the needs of international migrants and of their family members. In this context, the cooperation with sending countries is enriched with new contents and aims, and it becomes possi-

⁵⁰ Sarli A, Carrillo D., *Unasked Questions and Missing Answers: the Italian National Health System and Chinese Migrants in Milan*, MPC AS No.2014/01, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31977/AS01_2014_SS_Sarli_Carrillo.pdf?sequence=1

ble to “export” one of the main inventions of the European civilization: the welfare system, defined as a collective answer to individual problems.

- c) Finally, the third point I want to highlight refers to the *citizenship issue*. Without any ambition to enter into the current debate in Europe, I wish to emphasize how this debate is largely monopolised by procedural questions, despite the fact that we are facing an issue that must call into question the dimension of values and the sense of belonging to a political community that shares a collective identity.⁵¹ Again, on the opposite side, this debate is influenced by exclusivist ideologies, that look at national membership as an innate and unchangeable attribute. On the contrary, *the citizenship and immigration issue can become a precious occasion to rethink the theory and practice of citizenship tout court*. In the current Europe, often described as a continent homologated to a project defined by its most influential countries, migrants can provide an “external” point of view, concurring to give a more authentic representation of the European civil society. The latter is actually more and more heterogeneous at both ethnic, cultural and religious level. In this concern, it is worth observing that the role of transformation played by migrants’ could be of crucial importance within the framework of the European integration process. First of all, as has already been hinted at, migrants usually have developed good competences in managing transnational existences, relations and identities. Thus, they might feel as members of a society which goes beyond one single country’s borders. Besides, they are very likely to look at Europe from a more external perspective than native born: less linked to identity aspects associated with a particular EU country, they tend to feel more detached from the history of past conflicts and the issue of economic and social imbalances between EU nation-states.⁵² Instead, *they are likely to attach a certain importance to the fact that official discourse at EU level tends to present Europe as a geographical-political unit where the value of diversity is highly appreciated*. Subsequently, migrants may be more prone to identify with such a reality than with a specific country, featured by cultural and ethnic characteristics that they cannot fully acquire.

⁵¹ Zanfrini L., «Lo scenario contemporaneo: ripensare la cittadinanza nella società globale», *Studi Emigrazione/Migration Studies*, (L), 189, 2013, pp. 30-51.

⁵² Vogel D. and Leiprecht R., *Results Part II: Europe as a Positive Other for Immigrants?*, Interdisciplinary Centre for Education and Communication in Migration Processes, Oldenburg Universitat Web Publications, Final Activity Report Politis, 2007.

For all these reasons, *while increasing the diversity in Europe, migrants may also add to European cohesion, building a path towards the consolidation of a European identity and the development of an integrated European society.*⁵³ Finally, obliging us to “look at ourselves in the mirror”, migration represents an extraordinary occasion to rethink the values and principles which regulate our societies; the criteria on which the process of inclusion/exclusion into the community of citizens is founded; the notions of belonging and justice; the norms which regulate the acceptance of non-conformist behaviours; and the principles on which the dialogue with “others” must be inspired⁵⁴.

⁵³ Zanfrini L. (ed.), *The Diversity Value...*, above quoted.

⁵⁴ Zanfrini L., *Lo scenario contemporaneo...*, above quoted.

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