A fourth term for Ms. Merkel?
Two weeks away from the election, there is little doubt on the fact that Angela Merkel will go for a fourth term as Chancellor. Despite the salience of immigration for public opinion and the relatively open position of the Chancellor, there should not be any surprise as to the outcome of the General election this month.
Germany’s immigration background
Immigration is not a new phenomenon in Germany. As a matter of fact, the immigration model adopted by Germany after WWII, the so-called GastArbeiter (or guest worker) model, gave rise to a series of similar practices across the continent. Starting mostly from the 1950s, Germany implemented a temporary worker scheme to meet the needs of its booming economy. Bilateral agreements were signed with European countries, first with Italy, followed by Spain, Greece and Turkey; then with Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia after the construction of the Wall. The West-German federal labour office set up recruitment offices in those countries to select workers and test their skills. By 1973, a total of 2.6 million foreign worker were employed in Germany.
When the oil crisis hit in 1973, Germany, like most other European labour importers, sought to stem new influxes and invited its workers to go back to their countries of origin. But repatriation schemes were a blatant failure and temporary workers became permanent residents. Germany, quintessence of a ius sanguinis tradition, became the theatre of an ever more visible paradox: on the one hand, there was the automatic granting of nationality to Aussiedler (ethnic Germans) that would barely (if at all) speak German, and that would need costly integration courses; on the other hand, there were German-born, yet non-nationals living, studying and working in Germany and for whom there was no legal possibility to obtain citizenship. This is only in 2000 that the 1913 Nationality Law was deeply reformed, liberalizing nationalization for those who are not of German ancestry. Such reform was carried out by the SPD-Greens Schroeder government, in a context of strong anti-immigrant sentiment in the population and a very critical CDU/CSU opposition.
Immigration in German politics
Germany is a praised destination for those seeking a safer life and better economic prospects. This does not make everyone happy though, as the foundation of the PEGIDA movement in 2014 and the rise of the AfD over the years bear witness. The climax of anti-immigration sentiment in Germany may well have been reached with Merkel’s “open-door” policy in August 2015, when Berlin unilaterally suspended the Dublin Regulation’s most controversial provision, thus welcoming a tremendous number of asylum seekers.
A quick look at the salience of immigration in public opinion confirms the population’s concerns about the issue. As figure 1 shows, its importance in public opinion has consistently increased since 2012 and peaked at 76% of the respondents in fall 2015, just after Merkel announced Germany would welcome refugees. If salience of the issue has since then decreased, it nevertheless remains at a significant level.
Figure 1 – The importance of immigration for Germany in public opinion, spring 2007-spring 2017
Source: own elaboration on Eurobarometer data, question “What do you think are the two most important issues facing [your country]?”
In spring 2017, about 37% of the respondents consider immigration as one of the most important issues facing Germany, which makes it the most salient question, way more salient that unemployment (8%; yet the most important issue across the 28 EU members) or health and social security (13%) (Eurobarometer 87, 2017: 11).
Interestingly, the open-door policy announce also seems to have boosted the success of the AfD in opinion polls. With a share of supporters limited to the 5-7% of the voters since its creation, political support for the AfD started to rise from Merkel’s announce onward (see figure 2). Such rise has, however, come to a halt, despite political continuity in government. Whilst Merkel still holds a rather liberal position on migration, concerns in public opinion on the issue does not appear to deter voters’ support for stability. The CDU still appears to gather a bit less than 40% of the opinion, with her main competitor, SPD Schulz, standing more than 10 percentage points behind.
Figure 2 – Summary of opinion polls for the six main parties in Germany, Oct. 2013 to Sept. 2017
The General election
The CDU/CSU is unlikely to win more than 50% of the votes and will therefore have to build a coalition to govern. Whatever the coalition, there is little chance that it comprises a change on Merkel’s immigration or Europe stance. All the more so considering that Merkel’s main opponent, the SPD, is also her most likely future partner. As a matter of fact, she has already governed together with the SPD for her first and third (current) term. With voters keen on continuity, there is a possibility that the Grand Coalition is the preferred option.
The AfD, once a serious rival (notably in 2016 when its support rose notably with the sex assaults on New Year’s eve), has collapsed further to internal disputes and is no longer a threat for this year’s election. That said, if the party scored below the 5% threshold to enter the Bundestag in the 2013 General elections, it is most likely to fare better this year and get its seats in the lower house, making it the first far-right party in the house since WWII.